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BOOK REVIEW 
THE EICHMANN TRIAL 
Gregory S. Gordon∗ 
In 1960, the Israeli government abducted key Holocaust organizer Adolf 
Eichmann from Argentina and put him on trial in Jerusalem the following 
year.1 On the proceeding’s fiftieth anniversary, renowned Holocaust historian 
Deborah Lipstadt’s The Eichmann Trial2 offers a timely update to the only 
other book to focus primarily on the trial itself—Hannah Arendt’s 
controversial Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.3 As its 
famous subtitle suggests, Arendt’s book has more of a philosophical, as 
opposed to a legal, focus. Lipstadt’s work more than makes up for that. For a 
book that offers an excellent general introduction to the 1961 inquest, The 
Eichmann Trial also provides terrific insights into some of its complex legal 
issues. 
For instance, Lipstadt’s discussion of jurisdiction considers both its 
traditional ex post facto aspects—whether crimes against humanity, for 
example, could be charged when it was not an established offense during 
1941–1945—as well as its more unique temporal/geographic facets—whether 
Israel was entitled to try Adolf Eichmann when the state did not even exist 
until after the war.4 Similarly, given that Eichmann was kidnapped from 
Argentina by Israeli Mossad agents, were the Israeli proceedings against him 
proper from an international law perspective?5 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law, and Director, University of North 
Dakota Center for Human Rights and Genocide Studies. 
 1 See Lisa J. Del Pizzo, Note, Not Guilty—But Not Innocent: An Analysis of the Acquittal of John 
Demjanjuk and Its Impact on the Future of Nazi War Crimes Trials, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 137, 150 
(1995). 
 2 DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, THE EICHMANN TRIAL 25, 59 (2011). 
 3 See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1963). David 
Cesarani’s 2006 book Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes, and Trial of a “Desk Murderer” 
deals with the Eichmann trial in one of its chapters, but that is not the book’s main focus. See DAVID 
CESARANI, BECOMING EICHMANN: RETHINKING THE LIFE, CRIMES, AND TRIAL OF A “DESK MURDERER” 237–
323 (2006). 
 4 LIPSTADT, supra note 2, at 25, 59. 
 5 Id. at 21–25. 
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Lipstadt analyzes these issues with reference to both the arguments made at 
trial and the presiding judges’ written decision.6 The ex post facto issue had 
already been resolved at Nuremberg—crimes against humanity could be 
charged notwithstanding its recent vintage, as the international community 
recognized the Final Solution as inherently wrong and crimes against humanity 
best captured the nature of the offense.7 Lipstadt quotes the District Court that 
convicted Eichmann: “The Holocaust was not a ‘new crime which had not 
hitherto been known,’ but was a criminal act according to the laws of all 
civilized nations. . . . Eichmann and his compatriots knew their acts were 
wrong. Otherwise, why would they have tried to ‘efface the traces’ of them?”8 
Regarding the temporal/geographic problem posed by Israel’s post-war 
establishment, on one hand, Eichmann’s trial was a proper exercise of 
universal jurisdiction (although being applied to a human rights prosecution for 
the first time in history9) and “reinforced the notion that there is universal 
jurisdiction over genocide.”10 On the other hand, as to the role of the Jewish 
state in particular, Lipstadt again references the decision of the District Court:  
The aim of the Final Solution was the destruction of the “entire 
Jewish people.” To argue that there was “no connection” between 
Jews in Israel and Jews murdered by the Nazis “is like cutting away 
the roots and branches of a tree and saying to its trunk: I have not 
hurt you.”11 
And while Eichmann might have been abducted from Argentina, “courts 
had consistently ruled that how an accused is brought before a court does not 
negate its right to try him,” and, in any event “the abduction had no bearing on 
 
 6 Lipstadt does not consider the opinion of the Israeli Supreme Court, which heard the case on appeal 
and also opined on these issues, presumably because it affirmed and largely mirrored the District Court’s 
findings. See Attorney-Gen. of the Gov’t of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (Dist. Ct. 1961), aff’d, 36 I.L.R. 277 
(Sup. Ct. 1962) (1968). The Eichmann trial also raised a legal issue not addressed in Lipstadt’s book, namely 
Eichmann’s “Act of State” defense (that a state may not judge acts undertaken on behalf of another sovereign 
state—the presiding judges held that the Act of State defense for acts condemned as criminal under 
international law had been abrogated by the Nuremberg Charter and subsequent relevant legal instruments, 
including the Genocide Convention). See Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The Trial of Adolf Eichmann and the 
Quest for Global Justice, 8 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 45, 113–14 (2002). 
 7 LIPSTADT, supra note 2, at 26. 
 8 Id. at 141. 
 9 See Richard J. Goldstone, World Peace Through Justice Award Lecture, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 619, 620 (2009) (“Until that time universal jurisdiction applied only to piracy. Without the Nuremberg 
precedent, Adolph Eichmann would in all probability not have been tried in Jerusalem.”). 
 10 LIPSTADT, supra note 2, at 189. 
 11 Id. at 141. 
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the case because Eichmann had been in Argentina illegally.”12 More 
specifically, Eichmann had never applied for asylum in Argentina, lived there 
under an assumed name, and committed crimes that Argentina itself had 
condemned.13 
In addition to grappling with these legal questions, as well as the viability 
of Eichmann’s superior orders defense, Lipstadt considers an issue that has 
particular resonance in contemporary war crimes trials: the role played by 
victims in the proceedings.14 Lipstadt’s exploration of this issue is perhaps the 
book’s most important contribution from a legal perspective. Modern war 
crimes trials have not taken a consistent approach to the role of victims in war 
crimes proceedings. The Nuremberg and 1990s ad hoc tribunals, for example, 
had no formal role for victims—their testimony was offered strictly for the 
purpose of establishing factual predicates to satisfy legal elements.15 More 
recently, however, victims have taken on an official juridical role in 
international atrocity trials, which have attempted to incorporate elements of 
restorative justice.16 Both the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) explicitly 
contemplate victim participation and testimony.17 
Lipstadt reveals that the Eichmann trial was a forerunner of the ICC and 
ECCC in this regard. Israeli prosecutor Gideon Hausner wanted to do more 
than simply establish the individual criminal liability of Eichmann.18 He 
wanted to tell the horrible story of the Holocaust through survivors.19 Even if 
they were not direct witnesses to Eichmann’s specific culpable acts, these 
witnesses would help give the complete overview of the destruction of 
Europe’s Jewish community, raise international awareness about what 
happened, and thereby help bring catharsis to themselves and other survivors.20 
As Lipstadt notes: “[Prosecutor] Hausner’s determination that this trial would 
 
 12 Id. at 59. 
 13 Id. at 12, 16. 
 14 See id. at 188–203. This statement captures one of Lipstadt’s major conclusions. 
 15 See Janine Natalia Clark, Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court: Limitations and 
Possibilities, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 521, 529–30 (2011). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Charles P. Trumbull IV, The Victims of Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings, 29 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 777, 779 n.13 (2008) (recognizing the role given to victims by the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia as affording victims participatory privileges more broad than any existing 
international tribunal). Id. at n.13. 
 18 LIPSTADT, supra note 2, at xx. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See id. at 188–201. 
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be founded on the human story of the Jewish victims’ suffering stands, from a 
perspective of five decades, as the trial’s most significant legacy. . . . Through 
their testimony, what happened to European Jewry was transformed in the 
public’s consciousness.”21 
The Eichmann Trial also helps put the 1961 proceeding into the proper 
context of Holocaust-related legal history. It is particularly poignant in this 
regard given Lipstadt’s experience as the defendant in Holocaust denier David 
Irving’s 2000 defamation trial (as recounted in her 2005 book History on Trial: 
My Day in Court with David Irving).22 As the Daily Telegraph noted of the 
Irving proceeding, “This trial has done for the new century what the 
Nuremberg tribunals or the Eichmann trial did for earlier generations.”23 
Lipstadt peppers the manuscript with personal insights drawn from her unique 
perspective as a participant. Both Eichmann (in helping perpetrate the 
Holocaust) and Irving (in helping deny it ever happened) were motivated by 
Jew hatred, Lipstadt observes.24 She also notes that, although they were not 
trial witnesses, survivors let Lipstadt know that she was their voice and agent 
for preserving their memories:  
Though I did not represent the survivors, I felt their presence in that 
courtroom. They filled the public gallery. They gave me lists of the 
names of their murdered relatives. And when I prevailed, they 
embraced me, laughed, and cried with me. Though I’d never intended 
to do so, I ended up fighting for them.25 
One of the book’s many fascinating revelations, however, establishes a 
more direct link between the Eichmann and Irving proceedings. It turns out 
that during his trial, Eichmann had written a memoir.26 After his execution, 
Israel sealed the manuscript reasoning that Eichmann had already been given 
extensive opportunity to present his case.27 Previous requests to unseal it 
(including by one of Eichmann’s sons) had been rejected.28 But when Lipstadt 
requested access to the transcript during the Irving trial, permission was 
granted.29 The Eichmann and Irving cases were thus directly tied together as 
 
 21 Id. at 192–93. 
 22 DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, HISTORY ON TRIAL: MY DAY IN COURT WITH DAVID IRVING (2005). 
 23 Id. at xvii. 
 24 Id. at xix. 
 25 Id. at xxvi. 
 26 Id. at xvii. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at xviii. 
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Lipstadt used portions of the Nazi’s memoir to help refute Irving’s denial of 
the Final Solution.30 
Also interesting from a legal perspective is Lipstadt’s exploration of the 
individual attorneys and their procedural maneuverings and tactics. She reveals 
that chief prosecutor Gideon Hausner had only recently become Attorney 
General of Israel when Mossad agents abducted Eichmann in Argentina.31 A 
commercial law practitioner, Hausner had no previous criminal trial experience 
but nevertheless appointed himself lead trial attorney in Eichmann’s 
prosecution.32 Lipstadt provides an excellent assessment of his performance, 
noting Hausner’s eloquent oratory in the opening statement but his tactical 
deficiencies and inappropriate emotional displays during cross-examination 
(somewhat reminiscent of Justice Jackson’s inconsistent performance at 
Nuremberg).33 
Nevertheless, from a larger historical perspective, Hausner’s inexperience 
may have been an asset given his victim-centered presentation of the case. An 
experienced criminal practitioner might have focused more exclusively on 
easily provable, specifically defendant-linked evidence to establish 
Eichmann’s guilt (as prosecutors did for Saddam Hussein in the Dujail trial, for 
instance),34 but Hausner had another agenda in mind. Although the judges 
often berated him for what they perceived as irrelevant digressions, Hausner’s 
probing questions of victims are what seared the proceedings into the public’s 
memory.35 
At the same time, Lipstadt notes that Hausner tried to pin too much on 
Eichmann individually.36 Hausner saw Eichmann as a central figure in all 
Holocaust operations, but the so-called “desk killer” could not be linked, for 
 
 30 Id. at xix. 
 31 LIPSTADT, supra note 2, at 37. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 61–63, 117–18; see also Jonathan A. Bush, Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and Its 
Limitations, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 2022, 2050–51 (1993) (reviewing TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE 
NUREMBERG TRIALS (1992)) (describing Jackson’s difficulties cross-examining Herman Goering and 
recounting how Jackson “lost his temper” when the cross-examination was not going well). 
 34 See Timothy William Waters, A Kind of Judgment: Searching for Judicial Narratives After Death, 42 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 279, 296 n.58 (2010) (noting that Saddam Hussein was executed following “trial on 
a limited set of charges (pertaining to one massacre of 148 individuals in Dujail in 1982) before he could be 
tried on a much larger array of charges that would have been critical to any attempt to use the trial process to 
construct a narrative of his rule”). 
 35 LIPSTADT, supra note 2, at 85, 192–93. 
 36 Id. at 163. 
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example, to significant Nazi murder orgies such as Operation Reinhard or 
Einsatzgruppen mass shootings behind the lines in the Soviet Union.37 
Consistent with Lipstadt’s analysis, one commentator has noted:  
The Eichmann prosecution’s vast two-track approach had a distorting 
effect on the trial. At least one third of the proof (all that concerning 
the Einsatzgruppen, Operation Reinhard in Poland, the operation of 
specific concentration camps and the rise of pre-war German anti-
Semitism) had nothing to do with Eichmann at all.38 
Lipstadt also chronicles Eichmann’s difficulties finding appropriate defense 
counsel. He eventually settled on Robert Servatius, a German jurist who had 
represented Fritz Saukel, Karl Brandt, and Paul Peiger at Nuremberg.39 Israeli 
law had to be amended because foreign lawyers previously had no right of 
audience before Israeli courts.40 The new law enabled only those facing a 
capital charge to be represented by a non-Israeli lawyer.41 Although he was 
hired by Eichmann, Servatius’s legal fees were paid by the Israeli 
government.42 Lipstadt reveals that Servatius acquitted himself admirably on 
Eichmann’s behalf, navigating the defendant through nuanced explanations of 
his role and tactfully limiting his questions on cross to establishing that 
witnesses could not link their misfortunes directly to Eichmann.43 
While the trial itself is the tome’s focal point, it is bookended by excellent 
prefatory and postscript sections. In the former, Lipstadt describes her own 
recollections of the trial as a child and the relationship between the trial and 
her legal contest with David Irving.44 She also recounts the events leading up 
to the Eichmann trial, including a succinct and insightful biography of the 
defendant as well as a gripping account of his capture in Argentina.45 
This portion of the book contains fascinating and surprising information. 
For example, Lipstadt reveals that, contrary to public perceptions and Simon 
Wiesenthal’s own boasts, the famous Nazi hunter played no direct role in the 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Stephan Landsman, Those Who Remember the Past May Not Be Condemned To Repeat It, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 1564, 1576 (2002) (book review). 
 39 See Joseph Powderly, The Trials of Eichmann, Barbie and Finta, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 36 n.28 (William Schabas & Nadia Bernaz eds., 2011). 
 40 LIPSTADT, supra note 2, at 37–39. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See id. at 90–111. 
 44 Id. at 128. 
 45 Id. at 140. 
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capture of Eichmann.46 Similarly, the Argentines knew about the Israeli 
operation to abduct Eichmann and simply let it happen (Lipstadt speculates 
they wanted him off their hands, even though they officially protested the 
abduction for various political reasons).47 
This section also reveals the deep rift within the international Jewish 
community about the best way to bring Eichmann to justice. Outside of Israel, 
many prominent Jewish voices advocated handing Eichmann over to the 
Germans for trial or to an international tribunal (even though none existed at 
that point).48 As it turns out, the Germans were happy to let the Israelis handle 
the case, and the Cold War prevented re-creating another Nuremberg-style 
international tribunal. 
The book’s post-trial materials are similarly fascinating.49 The large focus 
here is on the trial’s most famous chronicler, Hannah Arendt, and her 
previously mentioned book based on her New Yorker magazine reportage. 
Arendt has been widely criticized over the years for her writings in relation to 
the Eichmann trial.50 Critics have found fault with her view of Eichmann 
himself.51 Despite clear evidence of his virulent anti-Semitism, Lipstadt notes 
Arendt’s portrayal of Eichmann as a mindless bureaucrat, at worst a “clown” 
with no ideological convictions, who simply followed orders (consistent with 
her pre-trial views regarding the nature of totalitarianism and her oft-quoted 
description of “the banality of evil”).52 In this regard, many point out that 
Arendt attended only parts of the trial and relied largely on transcripts for the 
substantial portions she missed (including, critically, Eichmann’s cross-
examination).53 
Critics also complain about Arendt’s treatment of victims.54 In her book, 
and in letters penned during the trial, she evinced an antipathy toward non-
resisting Holocaust victims based on her perception that non-resistance (and in 
the case of the Judenräte or Jewish Councils, her perception of active 
 
 46 Id. at 10. 
 47 Id. at 23. 
 48 Id. at 26. 
 49 Although certainly not necessary, in the interests of a complete record, the book might have benefited 
from a brief description of Eichmann’s unsuccessful appeal before the Israeli Supreme Court and his execution 
on May 31, 1962. See Lippman, supra note 6, at 105. 
 50 LIPSTADT, supra note 2, at 148–50. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See generally ARENDT, supra note 3. 
 53 LIPSTADT, supra note 2, at 178–81. 
 54 Id. 
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cooperation) was tantamount to complicity in Nazi crimes.55 Others point out 
that her reporting was compromised by her own arguably anti-Semitic 
prejudices.56 A German Jew, Arendt looked down on what she called 
“Ostjuden” (Jews from Eastern Europe). As a result, she ridiculed the 
performance of Gideon Hausner, whom she described in a letter to German 
philosopher Karl Jaspers as a “typical Galician Jew . . . constantly making 
mistakes. Probably one of those people who doesn’t know any language.”57 
She also harbored certain negative feelings about Israel and Jews of Middle 
Eastern origin. In another letter, she described Israeli crowds as “an Oriental 
mob, as if one were in Istanbul or some other half-Asiatic country.”58 She 
noted that the Israeli police force was giving her “the creeps, [it] speaks only 
Hebrew and looks Arabic.”59 
While Lipstadt acknowledges and shares in these criticisms, she also resists 
caricature treatment of this influential political theorist. Noting that Arendt 
“spoke with many voices,” Lipstadt points out that Arendt supported Israel’s 
right to take custody of Eichmann and sit in judgment of his crimes.60 Lipstadt 
also reveals that, notwithstanding the impression made on many by her 
writings during the Eichmann trial, Arendt was a strong supporter of Israel.61 
And though Arendt may have been critical of the Jewish Councils, which 
helped the Nazis organize the deportations and failed to warn victims of the 
fate that awaited them, so were many Jews in Israel and other parts of the 
international Jewish community.62 Moreover, Arendt was not alone in her 
belief that the trial was too victim-centered—the Israeli judges clearly shared 
that view as demonstrated by their on-record criticisms of Hausner’s strategy, 
in particular his emphasis on what the judges perceived as irrelevant 
evidence.63 
Finally, Lipstadt observes that Arendt was right about a central feature of 
Nazism (indeed, all totalitarian societies) and the Final Solution, in particular: 
for their success, they require compliant masses who simply obey orders 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 152–53. 
 57 Id. at 152. 
 58 Id. at 153. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 180. 
 61 Id. at 181–83. 
 62 Id. at 184. 
 63 Id. 
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without thinking about the consequences.64 Indeed, Arendt’s views on this 
have exerted a great influence on the development of political philosophy.65 
That Arendt inaptly used the Eichmann trial as an illustration of her theory 
does not lessen the theory’s power or historical import. 
It turns out that Eichmann was not one of these masses. Contrary to his 
protestations at trial, he was a Nazi leader with strong ideological convictions 
and in many instances he acted as a creative, independent agent within the 
Nazi bureaucracy.66 As Lipstadt notes,  
Though he may not have started out as a virulent anti-Semite, he 
absorbed this ideology early in his career and let it motivate him to 
such an extent that after the war he described . . . the joy he had felt at 
moving Hungarian Jews to their death at an unprecedented clip and 
his pleasure at having the death of millions of Jews on his record.67  
And his attempts, in concert with his other Nazi cohorts, to conceal his crimes 
after the fact demonstrate that he knew his actions were illegal.68 
Certainly, Arendt’s perceptions of the Eichmann trial must be taken with 
the proverbial grain of salt. But Lipstadt’s book helps balance conventional 
wisdom. In that sense, as in many others, The Eichmann Trial makes an 
invaluable contribution to the literature. This remarkably compact but 
informative tome not only recounts what happened at the trial; it also provides 
perspective on the legal, historical, and philosophical implications of this 
seminal event, making it a terrific read for the both the general public and 
experts. As such, in another half-century’s time, Lipstadt’s volume may very 
well stand as the definitive chronicle of an epochal proceeding. 
 
 
 64 Id. at 185–87. 
 65 See Hannah Arendt, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 27, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
arendt (noting that Arendt provided “a new framework that could enable us to come to terms with the twin 
horrors of the twentieth century, Nazism and Stalinism”). 
 66 LIPSTADT, supra note 2, at 169–70. 
 67 Id. at 169–70. 
 68 Id. 
